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Abstract
We consider a controlled linear-quadratic (LQ) large-population system with mixture of three
types agents: major leader, minor leaders and minor followers. The Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (SNC)
approximate equilibrium is studied by a major-minor mean-field game (MFG) coupled with a leader-
follower Stackelberg game. By variational method, the SNC approximate equilibrium strategy can be
represented by some forward-backward-stochastic-differential-equations (FBSDEs) in the open-loop
sense. And we pay great effort to give the feedback form of the open-loop strategy by some Riccati
equations.
Key words: Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot approximate equilibrium, Mean-field game, FBSDE, Leader-
follower game, Major-minor agent, Open-loop strategy, Closed-loop strategy.
1 Introduction
On a given finite time horizon [0, T ], let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space on which a (1 +
Nl+Nf )-dimensional standard Brownian motion {W0(t),Wi(t), W˜j(t)}0≤t≤T is defined. In this paper, we
consider a large-population system involving (1+Nl+Nf ) individual agents (where Nl and Nf are very
large) which are mixed with three types: the major-leader, denoted by A0, minor-leaders Ali, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nl
and the followers Afj , 1 ≤ j ≤ Nf . The dynamics of A0, {Ali}Nli=1, {Afj }Nfj=1 are given respectively by the
following controlled linear stochastic differential equations:
A0 :

dX0(t) = {A0X0(t) +B0u0(t) + E10X(Nl)(t) + F 10 x(Nf )(t)}dt
+ {C0X0(t) +D0u0(t) + E20X(Nl)(t) + F 20 x(Nf )(t)}dW0(t),
X0(0) = ξ0,
(1)
Ali : i = 1, 2, . . . , Nl,

dXi(t) = {AXi(t) +Bui(t) + E1X(Nl)(t)}dt
+ {CXi(t) +Dui(t) + E2X(Nl)(t)}dWi(t)
Xi(0) = ξi
(2)
and
Afj : j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf ,

dxj(t) = {A˜xj(t) + B˜vj(t) + F1x(Nf )(t)}dt
+ {C˜xj(t) + D˜vj(t) + F2x(Nf )(t)}dW˜j(t)
xj(0) = ζj ,
(3)
where X(Nl)(t) = 1
Nl
∑Nl
i=1Xi(t) and x
(Nf )(t) = 1
Nf
∑Nf
j=1 xj(t) are called state-average or mean field
term. A0, A, A˜, B0, B, B˜, C0, C, C˜, D0, D, D˜, E
1
0 , E
2
0 , E1, E2, F
1
0 , F
2
0 , F1, F2 are deterministic
constant matrices with proper dimensions. In the above, X0(·), Xi(·), xj(·) are called the state process
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taking values in Rn with initial values ξ0, ξi, ζj which are random variables. u0(·), ui(·), vj(·) are called
admissible controls taken by (1 + Nl + Nf) players in the game and taking values in R
m1 , Rm2 , Rm3 ,
respectively. Under some mild conditions on the coefficients, for any initial values ξ0, ξi, ζj , (1), (2) and
(3) admits a unique strong solution. The performance can be measured by the following cost functionals :
for A0,
J0(u0(·),u(·),v(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(∥∥∥X0(t)− (λ0X(Nl)(t) + (1 − λ0)x(Nf )(t))∥∥∥2
Q0
+ ‖u0(t)‖2R0
)
dt+ ‖X0(T )‖2H0
}
;
(4)
for Ali, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nl;
J li (u0(·), ui(·),u−i(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(∥∥∥Xi(t)− (λX(Nl)(t) + (1 − λ)X0(t))∥∥∥2
Q
+ ‖ui(t)‖2R
)
dt+ ‖Xi(T )‖2H
}
,
(5)
and for Afj , 1 ≤ j ≤ Nf ,
J fj (u0(·),u(·), vj(·),v−j(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(∥∥∥xj(t)− (λ˜1X0(t) + λ˜2X(Nl)(t) + λ˜3x(Nf )(t))∥∥∥2
Q˜
+ ‖vj(t)‖2R˜
)
dt+ ‖xj(T )‖2H˜
}
.
(6)
where for given vector z, ‖z‖2M = 〈Mz, z〉 for M is any matrix or matrix-valued function of suitable
dimensions, and where Q0, Q, Q˜, R0, R, R˜,H0, H, H˜ are deterministic symmetric matrix of suitable di-
mensions. As we can see, all agents are coupled not only in their state process but also in their cost
functionals with convex combinations of state-average.
Roughly speaking, agent Afj will give his/her best respond according to the strategies from major
leader A0 and minor leaders Ali to minimize his/her own cost functional J fj (u0(·),u(·), vj(·),v−j(·)). And
agent A0 will also give his/her best respond according to the strategies minor leaders Ali and the best
respond of minor followers to minimize his/her own cost functional J0(u0(·),u(·),v(·)). Knowing the best
respond of major leader and minor followers, agent Ali wants to minimize his/her own cost functional
J li (u0(·), ui(·),u−i(·)) by choosing an optimal control ui(·). However, due to the state-average coupling,
our problem is essentially a high-dimensional Stackelberg-Nash differential game. Moreover, A0 is the
the dominate or major leader because it effects the cost functionals of all minor leaders.
We call the above problem formulated as Mixed Stakelberg-Nash Major-minor (SN-MM) differential
game. The following comments on our formulation further verify such terminology.
(Single leader-follower game) In case Nl = 0, Nf = 1, thus there has no minor leaders and only
single followers, with one major leader, then our problem reduces to the classical single-leader and single-
follower game. The Stackelberg game has been proposed in 1934 by H. von Stackelberg [30], when he
defined a concept of a hierarchical solution for markets where some firms have power of dominating over
others. This solution concept is now known as the Stackelberg equilibrium. Early study for stochastic
Stackelberg differential games (SSDG) can be seen in Basar (1979) [2]. A pioneer work was done by Yong
(2002) [32], where a LQ leader-follower stochastic differential game (SDG) was introduced and studied.
The coefficients of the system and the cost functionals are random, the controls enter the diffusion
term of the state equation, and the weight matrices for the controls in the cost functionals are not
necessarily positive definite. To give a state feedback representation of the OL Stackelberg equilibrium,
the related Riccati equations are derived and sufficient conditions for the existence of their solution with
deterministic coefficients are discussed. Here after, Bensoussan, Chen, and Sethi (2015) [4] obtained the
global maximum principles for both open-loop (OL) and closed-loop (CL) SSDG whereas the diffusion
term does not contain the controls. The solvability of related Riccati equations is discussed, in order to
obtain the state feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.
(Multiple leaders-followers game) In case Nl, Nf are of medium or small size, then our problem is
reduced to the Stackelberg game with multiple leaders and multiple followers. It is a natural extension
of the single leader-follower game and the relevant works include [5, 6, 28], etc.
(Mean-field-game with symmetric agents) In case Nl = 0, and no A0 involved, then our problem
becomes the standard dynamic game with a very large number of minor (symmetric) agents in which
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each single agent interacts with the mass-effect of other agents only through coupling in states/dynamics.
For large population stochastic dynamics, one effective method is to search its decentralized strategies by
the mean-field-game (MFG) theory. We recall that there are much work to study mean field game (MFG).
Since the recent independent works by Huang, Caines, and Malhame´ [19,20] and Lasry and Lions [22–24],
mean field game (MFG) theory and its applications have enjoyed rapid growth. MFG provides a simpler
alternative framework for tackling the interactive game for a large number of homogeneous agents. By
allowing agents to interact through a common medium, known as the mean field term, formulation of the
dynamic game under the MFG framework consists of only a few equations. Further developments on the
theory of MFG can be found in the works of Andersson and Djehiche [1], Bardi [3], Bensoussan, Frehse,
and Yam [8], Buckdahn et al. [7], Cardaliaguet [10], Carmona and Delarue [11], Garnier, Papanicolaou,
and Yang [15], Gue´ant, Lasry, and Lions [16], Meyer-Brandis, Øksendal, and Zhou [25], and the references
therein.
(Major-minor game) In case Nf = 0, then there has no followers and only major and minor leaders
involved, and our problem becomes the major-minor (MM) mean-field game (MFG). The MM-MFG is
introduced in [21], and has been well investigated by [27] common major-minor mean field LQG game
(refer to [27]). Our model generalizes [5, 6, 27, 28] because it includes not only leader-follower structure
but also major-minor structure.
(Convex combination) Refer to Nourian, Caines, Malhame´ and Huang (2012) [28], here we consider a
kind of general case of cost functional with likelihood ratio (i.e. convex combination). On other words,
for an example, the cost functional of the major leaders is based on a trade-off between keeping cohesion
of the flock of minor leaders and keeping cohesion of the flock of the followers (see (4)). By the way, we
may be interested in special case like λ˜3 6= 0 which means the cost functional of followers are directly
influenced by the major-leader or λ˜3 = 0 which means the cost functional of followers are not directly
influenced by the major-leader. We will discuss difference between the special case and the general case
in following sections.
Remark 1.1. Application of our problem formulation may be found in power markets involving large
size of consumers and large utilities together with the following producer; inventory management without
stocking capacities. (refer to [13]) The state processes are characterized by three kinds of group. One
we called major leader agent can be regarded as the government or supervisory in the economic issues.
And the ones we called minor leader agents can be regarded as the corresponding companies or firms.
The rest ones we called minor follower agents can be regarded as the related suppliers of raw material
or manufacturers of primary commodity, etc. We can see that the state processes of three types of group
have no influence on each other but the cost functionals do have direct influence on each other.
Our present work considers the combination problems of leader-follower and major-minor systems,
where the large scale population is also under consideration. In the entire system, the major and a part
of minor agents are together regarded as the leaders, which are called major-leader and minor-leaders
respectively and the rest are called minor followers (followers). Obviously, the more complex structure
will bring some technical problem. Besides, there are lots of interesting questions remain to be solved.
For an example, we can consider the state processes include the mean-field term which may coincide the
real world much better or focus on the more realistic cost functional, etc.
Let us now explain the argument structure of our problem. In principle, the above problem can
be studied as a MM-MFG coupled with a leader-follower game. Accordingly, original problem can be
analyzed through the following structures:
Step 1: Fix the mass effect limit of minor leaders mX and major leader (x0, u0). With frozen
(x0, u0,mX), introduce and solve the auxiliary problem to get the best decentralized response function
of minor followers, denoted by mx = mx(x0, u0,mX).
Step 2: Given the response functional mx, and frozen mX , solve the decentralized SOC problem of
A0, and denote the optimal solution pair as (X0, u0).
Step 3: Given mx, solve the optimal control for the minor leaders. Influenced by the optimal control
of major leader u0(·) (supposing it exists, which depends on the choices u(·) of minor leaders and the
initial state ξ0, ξi, ζj , in general), agents Ali, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nl, (the minor leaders) would like to choose some
ui(·) to minimize J li (u0(·), ui(·),u−i(·)).
Step 4 CC condition to specify mX and all decentralized strategies can be designed. Approximate
Stackelberg-Counot-Nash equilibrium can be verified.
The main contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows:
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• The decentralized strategy profile is investigated in both (semi-)closed-loop and open-loop sense.
• Existence and uniqueness of the CC condition system is investigated in the global solvability case.
• the CC condition system is represented via a full-coupled mean-field type FBSDE in open-loop
case, and FBSDE and non-standard Riccati equation in closed-loop sense.
• The approximate Nash equilibrium Stakleberg game is verified under more general condition (more
than standard assumption with positive-definitiveness on coefficient matrix).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give the formal problem formulation
and some preliminaries. In section 3, we discuss the open-loop strategy of Stackelberg mixed major-minor
games. In section 4 We get the consistency condition system equations based on the open-loop strategy,
which is a fully coupled FBSDE. Besides, we get the criteria to judge the well-posedness of such a FBSDE.
At last, we verify the OL strategy we got is ε-Nash equilibrium OL strategy of the original problem.
2 Preliminary and formulation
The following notations will be used throughout this paper. Let Rn denotes the n−dimensional
Euclidean space, Rn×m be the set of all (n×m) matrices, and let Sn be the set of all (n× n) symmetric
matrices. We denote the transpose by subscript ⊤, the inner product by 〈·, ·〉 and the norm by | · |. For
t ∈ [0, T ] and Euclidean space H, we introduce the following function spaces:
Lp(t, T ;H) =
{
ψ : [t, T ]→ H
∣∣∣ ∫ T
t
|ψ(s)|pds <∞
}
, 1 ≤ p <∞,
L∞(t, T ;H) =
{
ψ : [t, T ]→ H
∣∣∣ esssups∈[t,T ]|ψ(s)| <∞},
C([t, T ];H) =
{
ψ : [t, T ]→ H
∣∣∣ ψ(·) is continuous}.
and the spaces of process or random variables on given filtrated probability space:
L2Ft(Ω;H) =
{
ξ : Ω→ H
∣∣∣ ξ is Ft−measurable, E[|ξ|2] <∞},
L2F(t, T ;H) =
{
ψ : [t, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣∣ ψ(·) is Ft−progressively measurable, E[ ∫ T
t
|ψ(s)|2ds
]
<∞
}
,
L2F(Ω;C([t, T ];H)) =
{
ψ : [t, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣∣ ψ(·) is Ft−adapted, continuous, E[ sup
t≤s≤T
|ψ(s)|2
]
<∞
}
,
L2F(Ω;L
1(t, T ;H)) =
{
ψ : [t, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣∣ ψ(·) is Ft−progressively measurable, E[ ∫ T
t
|ψ(s)|ds
]2
<∞
}
.
We set the following information structures, which are important to introduce our admissible strategies:
{Ft}0≤t≤T is the natural filtration generated by all BM components {W0(·),Wi(·), W˜j(·)} augmented by
all the P-null sets in F , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nl, 1 ≤ j ≤ Nf , it can be viewed as the full information of all states and
noises; {F0t }0≤t≤T is the natural filtration generated by {W0(·), X0(·)} augmented by all the P-null sets
in F . It is the space on which the limiting state-average should be adapted; {F it}0≤t≤T is the natural
filtration generated by {Wi(·), Xi(·)} augmented by all the P-null sets in F , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nl; {Gjt }0≤t≤T is
the natural filtration generated by {W˜j(·), Yj(·)} augmented by all the P-null sets in F , 1 ≤ j ≤ Nf .
Given information structures, we can set the following Hilbert spaces for centralized and decentralized
strategies for individual agents in open-loop sense:
Uc0 [0, T ] ,L2F(0, T ;Rm1),
Uci [0, T ] ,L2F(0, T ;Rm2), i = 1, 2, . . . , Nl,
Vcj [0, T ] ,L2F(0, T ;Rm3), j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf ,
(7)
and decentralized open-loop strategies:
Ud0 [0, T ] ,L2F0(0, T ;Rm1),
Udi [0, T ] ,L2Fi(0, T ;Rm2), i = 1, 2, . . . , Nl,
Vdj [0, T ] ,L2Gj (0, T ;Rm3), j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf .
(8)
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Let (u0,u,v) = (u0, u1, . . . , uNl , v1, . . . , vNf ) denote the strategy set of all (1 + Nl + Nf) agents; u =
(u1, . . . , uNl) the set of control strategies of all Nl major-leader agents; v = (v1, . . . , vNf ) the set of
strategy profile of all Nf follower agents; u−i = (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uNl) the control strategy set of
major-leader agents except Ali; v−j = (v1, . . . , vj−1, vj+1, . . . , vNf ) the control strategy set of follower
agents except the jth follower agent Afj .
Sometimes, when defining the Stakelberg-Nash-Counor strategy, it is helpful to set the following
product space for strategy set. We denote{Uc[0, T ] = Uc1 [0, T ]× · · · × UcNl [0, T ], Vc[0, T ] = Vc1 [0, T ]× · · · × VcNf [0, T ],
Ud[0, T ] = Ud1 [0, T ]× · · · × UdNl [0, T ], Vd[0, T ] = Vd1 [0, T ]× · · · × VdNf [0, T ],
Uc−i[0, T ] = Uc1 [0, T ]× · · · × Uci−1[0, T ]× Uci+1[0, T ]× · · · × UcNl [0, T ],
Vc−j [0, T ] = Vc1 [0, T ]× · · · × Vcj−1[0, T ]× Vcj+1[0, T ]× · · · × VcNf [0, T ],
Ud−i[0, T ] = Ud1 [0, T ]× · · · × Udi−1[0, T ]× Udi+1[0, T ]× · · · × UdNl [0, T ],
Vd−j [0, T ] = Vd1 [0, T ]× · · · × Vdj−1[0, T ]× Vdj+1[0, T ]× · · · × VdNf [0, T ].
Then any (u0,u,v) ∈ Uc0 [0, T ] × Uc[0, T ] × Vc[0, T ] is called an admissible centralized strategy, and any
(u0,u,v) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ]× Ud[0, T ]× Vd[0, T ] is called an admissible decentralized strategy.
Let us introduce the following hypothesis on coefficients of state dynamics and cost functionals:
(H1) The coefficients of the state equations and cost functionals satisfy the following:
A0, A, A˜, C0, C, C˜, E
1
0 , E
2
0 , E1, E2, F
1
0 , F
2
0 , F1, F2 ∈ Rn×n;
B0, D0 ∈ Rn×m1 ; B,D ∈ Rn×m2 ; B˜, D˜ ∈ Rn×m3 .
Q0, Q, Q˜,H0, H, H˜ ∈ Sn;
R0 ∈ Sm1 ; R ∈ Sm2 ; R˜ ∈ Sm3 .
(H2) The initial states ξ0, ξi, ζj ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn) are independent; E[ξi] = E[ζj ] = 0, for each i = 1, . . . , Nl,
j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf ; and there exists c0 < ∞ independent of Nl and Nf such that supi≥0 E[|ξi|2] ≤ c0
and supj≥1 E[|ζj |2] ≤ c0.
We point out that no positive-definiteness/non-negativeness conditions on the weighting matrix/matrix-
valued functions imposed in (H1). Moreover, the coefficients of the convex combination 0 ≤ λ0, λ, λ˜1, λ˜2,
λ˜3 ≤ 1. Under (H1), for any (x0, u0(·)) ∈ Rn × Uc0 [0, T ] (resp., Rn × Ud0 [0, T ]), (x, ui(·)) ∈ Rn × Uci [0, T ]
(resp., Rn × Udi [0, T ]), (y, vj(·)) ∈ Rn × Vcj [0, T ] (resp., Rn × Vdj [0, T ]), (1), (2), (3) admits a unique
(strong) solution. And the cost functionals (4), (5), (6) are also well-defined.
For simplicity, in (H2) it is assumed that all minor leaders and followers have zero initial mean. It
is possible to generalize our analysis to deal with different initial means as long as {E[ξi], i ≥ 1} and
{E[ζj ], j ≥ 1} has a limiting empirical distribution. Now, we can introduce the Stakelberg-Counot-Nash
equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2.1. A (1 + Nl + Nf)-tuple (u0[·],u(·),v[·]), is called an open-loop Stakelberg-Counot-Nash
equilibrium for the initial states ξ0, ξi, ζj ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn) if:
J fj (u0(·),u(·), vj [u0(·),u(·), ξ0, ξi, ζj ](·),v−j(·))
= min
vj(·)∈Vcj [0,T ]
J fj (u0(·),u(·), vj(·),v−j(·)), ∀u0(·) ∈ Uc0 [0, T ], u(·) ∈ Uc[0, T ],
J0(u0[u(·), ξ0, ξi, ζj ](·),u(·),v[u0[u(·), ξ0, ξi, ζj ](·),u(·), ξ0, ξi, ζj ](·))
= min
u0(·)∈Uc0 [0,T ]
J0(u0(·),u(·),v[u0(·),u(·), ξ0, ξi, ζj ](·)), ∀u(·) ∈ Uc[0, T ],
J li (u0[ui(·),u−i(·), ξ0, ξi, ζj ](·), ui(·),u−i(·))
= min
ui(·)∈Uci [0,T ]
J li (u0[u(·), ξ0, ξi, ζj ](·), ui(·),u−i(·)),
(9)
where vj : Uc0 [0, T ] × Uc[0, T ]× L2F0(Ω;Rn) × L2F0(Ω;Rn) × L2F0(Ω;Rn) → Vcj [0, T ], and u0 : Uc[0, T ]×
L2F0(Ω;R
n)× L2F0(Ω;Rn)× L2F0(Ω;Rn)→ Uc0 [0, T ].
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If there is no confusion, we use the same notation to denote the optimal respond and the optimal
strategy of major leader and minor followers. The above definition of OL strategy is defined in centralized
sense. In particular, game theory has been formulated to capture such individual interest seeking behavior
of the agents in many social, economic and man-made systems.
For fixed N = Nl+Nf , if each agents can access the full information (states) of other agents, we may
view the problem as a standard dynamic LQG leader-follower games and use the full information DPP
to derive the Stakelberg-Counot-Nash equilibrium. We now introduce the following definition. However,
scale dynamic model, this approach results in an analytic complexity which is in general prohibitively
high, and correspondingly leads to few substantive dynamic optimization results. The optimization of
large-scale linear control systems wherein i) many agents are coupled with each other via their individual
dynamics, and ii) the costs are in an individual to the mass form was presented in where the theory of
mean field (MF) control (previously termed Nash Certainty Equivalence) was introduced. It is to be
noted that the dynamic large-scale cost coupled optimization structure of is motivated by a variety of
scenarios, for instance, those analyzed in MFG analysis.
2.1 Mixed Stakelberg-Counot-Nash equilibrium analysis
To deal with mixed leader-follower MM dynamic game using MFG theory, one should start with
followers. And to deal with a major-minor MFG, one should start with major players. Although the
relationships get complicated under our situation, we can still deal with it step by step. That is, firstly,
we can solve the optimization problems of followers. The left is a classic major-minor problem and solved
in the way of [21]. The interesting things occur when the major-leader imposes some direct impacts to
the followers (i.e., λ˜3 6= 0), which will lead to that the state process of major leader will be relied on a
kind of forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE). Generally speaking, it is hard to get
the centralized strategy of such mixed Stackelberg MM-MFG. So, let us briefly look at the procedure of
finding a decentralized open-loop ε-Nash equilibrium strategy of the original problem. And the procedure
of finding a decentralized closed-loop ε-Nash equilibrium strategy is very similar which will be formulated
in next subsection.
Step 1: MFG analysis of followers: Let us introduce the auxiliary limiting LQG differential
game problems. Firstly, by the Stackelberg game, for given strategy of major leader and minor leaders,
followers have to minimize the following cost functionals:
J fj (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·);u0(·),u(·), vj(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(∥∥∥xj(t)− (λ˜1X0(t) + λ˜2mX(t) + λ˜3x(Nf )(t))∥∥∥2
Q˜
+ ‖vj(t)‖2R˜
)
dt+ ‖xj(T )‖2H˜
}
,
where mX(·) = limNl→+∞X(Nl)(·). Furthermore, as Nf → +∞, we suppose x(Nf )(·) can be approxi-
mated by F0t -measurable function mx(·). Then the state process of the follower becomes{
dxj(t) = {A˜xj(t) + B˜vj(t) + F1mx(t)}dt+ {C˜xj(t) + D˜vj(t) + F2mx(t)}dW˜j(t)
xj(0) = ζj ,
(10)
with the following auxiliary cost functionals
J
f
j (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(∥∥∥xj(t)− (λ˜1X0(t) + λ˜2mX(t) + λ˜3mx(t))∥∥∥2
Q˜
+ ‖vj(t)‖2R˜
)
dt+ ‖xj(T )‖2H˜
}
,
(11)
for Afj , 1 ≤ j ≤ Nf . To distinguish from the original problem, we use the new state variables xj and
we will denote X0 and Xi the new state variables later. But we still use the same set of variables
u0, ui, vj ,W0,Wi, W˜j in this auxiliary limiting problem, and such a reuse of notation should cause no
confusion. Then, introduce the following auxiliary Nash game for followers as follows.
Problem (OL1). For given ξ0, ζj ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn), F0t -measurable functions mX(·),mx(·), and the
control u0(·) of major leader A0, find an open-loop strategy vj(·) = vj [u0(·),mX(·),mx(·), ξ0, ζj ] ∈
Vdj [0, T ], 1 ≤ j ≤ Nf . On other words, Find the Nash equilibrium response functional vj [·] : Ud0 [0, T ]×
6
L2F0(0, T ;R
n) × L2F0(0, T ;Rn) × L2F0(Ω;Rn) × L2F0(Ω;Rn) → Vdj [0, T ] of the following Nash differential
games among followers:
J
f
j (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj [u0(·),mX(·),mx(·), ξ0, ζj ]) = inf
vj(·)∈Vdj [0,T ]
J
f
j (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·)).
The analysis of Problem (OL1) can be further decomposed into substeps using MFG theory.
Step 1.1 (SOC-F): Fixed mx, and consider the Nash equilibrium response functional of the above
Problem (OL1) for representative minor-follower agent denoted by vj [·]. For given ξ0, ζj ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn),F0t -measurable functions mX(·),mx(·), and the control u0(·) of major leader A0, find an open-loop strat-
egy vj(·) = vj [u0(·),mX(·),mx(·), ξ0, ζj ] ∈ Vdj [0, T ], 1 ≤ j ≤ Nf . On other words, Find the Nash equilib-
rium response functional vj [·] : Ud0 [0, T ]× L2F0(0, T ;Rn) × L2F0(0, T ;Rn) × L2F0(Ω;Rn) × L2F0(Ω;Rn) →
Vdj [0, T ] of the following Nash differential games among followers:
J
f
j (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj [u0(·),mX(·),mx(·), ξ0, ζj ]) = inf
vj(·)∈Vdj [0,T ]
J
f
j (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·)).
Step 1.2 (CC-F): applying state-aggregation method, it is possible to determine the state-average
limit mx by the following condition:
E
[
xj
(
vj [u0(·),mX(·),mx(·), ξ0, ζj ]
)∣∣∣F0t ] = mx.
By such step, the Nash equilibrium response functional of follower and mx = mx(ξ0, ζj , u0,mX) can be
specified, given any admissible profile announced by leaders.
Given the approximate Nash response of all followers, we can turn to the Nash analysis of all leaders.
To this, it is necessary to have some MM-MFG analysis when there are both major-minor agents.
Step 2: MFG analysis of major-leader: Anticipating the Nash equilibrium response functional
of follower mx = mx(ξ0, ζj , u0,mX), the leaders should solve some Nash equilibrium with size Nl + 1.
Similarly, we can assume that as Nl → +∞, we suppose X(Nl)(·) can be approximated by F0t -measurable
function mX(·). Then the state process of the major leader and minor leaders becomes
dX0(t) = {A0X0(t) +B0u0(t) + E10mX(t) + F 10mx(t)}dt
+ {C0X0(t) +D0u0(t) + E20mX(t) + F 20mx(t)}dW0(t),
X0(0) = ξ0,
(12)
and {
dXi(t) = {AXi(t) +Bui(t) + E1mX(t)}dt+ {CX i(t) +Dui(t) + E2mX(t)}dWi(t)
Xi(0) = ξi.
(13)
with the following auxiliary cost functionals
J0(ξ0,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·)) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(∥∥∥X0(t)− (λ0mX(t) + (1− λ0)mx(t))∥∥∥2
Q0
+ ‖u0(t)‖2R0
)
dt+ ‖X0(T )‖2H0
}
,
(14)
for A0, and
J li(ξ0, ξi,mX(·);ui(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(∥∥∥Xi(t)− (λmX(t) + (1− λ)X0(t))∥∥∥2
Q
+ ‖ui(t)‖2R
)
dt+ ‖Xi(T )‖2H
}
,
(15)
for Ali, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nl. This can be formulated into MM-MFG. We can analyze the optimal control of major
leader first. We can set the following auxiliary problem for the major-leader.
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Problem (OL2). For given ξ0 ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn) and F0t -measurable functions mX(·), find an open-loop
strategy u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ] such that
J0(ξ0,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·)) = inf
u0(·)∈Ud0 [0,T ]
J0(ξ0,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·)).
Step 3: MFG analysis of minor-leader: Anticipating the Nash equilibrium response functional
of follower mx = mx(ξ0, ζj , u0,mX) and the optimal control u0 of the major leader. Under the state
process (13) with the cost functional (15), we consider the following problem for minor-leaders.
Problem (OL3). For given ξ0, ξi ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn) × L2F0(Ω;Rn), and F0t -measurable functions mX(·),
find an open-loop strategy ui(·) ∈ Udi [0, T ], 1 ≤ i ≤ Nl, such that
J li (ξ0, ξi,mX(·);ui(·)) = inf
ui(·)∈Udi [0,T ]
J li (ξ0, ξi,mX(·);ui(·)).
Step 4: Consistency condition of (Open-loop) Stakelberg-Cornot-Nash equlibrium: CC
condition to determine the frozen mX by
E
[
Xi
(
ui(mX)
)∣∣∣F0t ] = mX .
And turn to get its global solvability.
In order to show the steps more clearly, here we illustrate the steps by the figure as follows.
(X0, u0) (xj , vj [u0,mX ,mx])
E[Xi(ui[X0,mX ])] = mX E[xj(vj [u0,mX ,mx])] = mx
(Xi, ui[X0,mX ]) (X0, u0[mX , mx])
Step 1.1
Step 1.2
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
3 Open-loop strategies
From now on, we will suppress time variable t in the equation unless it is necessary. In this section,
we study the Mixed S-MM-game strategy in OL sense.
3.1 Open-loop strategies for the followers
In this subsection, we solve out Problem (OL1) firstly. The main result of this section can be stated
as follows.
Theorem 3.1. Under assumptions (H1), (H2), and let ζj ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn), u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ], X0(·) ∈
L2F0(0, T ;R
n), mX(·), mx(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn) be given. Then vj(·) ∈ Vdj [0, T ] is an open-loop decentralized
optimal control of Problem (OL1) for initial value ζj if and only if the following two conditions hold:
(i) For j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf , the adapted solution (xj(·), yj(·), zj(·)) to the FBSDE on [0, T ]
dxj = {A˜xj + B˜vj + F1mx}dt+ {C˜xj + D˜vj + F2mx}dW˜j(t)
dyj = −
{
A˜⊤yj + C˜
⊤zj + Q˜
(
xj −
(
λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx
))}
dt+ zjdW˜j(t),
xj(0) = ζj , yj(T ) = H˜xj(T ),
(16)
satisfies the following stationarity condition:
B˜⊤yj + R˜vj + D˜
⊤zj = 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. (17)
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(ii) For j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf , the following convexity condition holds:
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q˜xj , xj
〉
+
〈
R˜vj , vj
〉)
dt+
〈
H˜xj(T ), xj(T )
〉}
≥ 0, ∀vj(·) ∈ Vdj [0, T ], (18)
where xj(·) is the solution to the FSDEdxj =
{
A˜xj + B˜vj
}
dt+
{
C˜Yj + D˜vj
}
dW˜j(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xj(0) = 0.
(19)
Or, equivalently, the map vj(·) 7→ Jfj (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·)), ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf is convex.
Proof. For given ζj ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn), u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ],X0(·) ∈ L2F0(0, T ;Rn),mX(·),mx(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn),
and vj(·) ∈ Vdj [0, T ], let (xj(·), yj(·), zj(·)) be adapted solution to FBSDE (16). For any vj(·) ∈ Vdj [0, T ]
and ε ∈ R, let xεj(·) be the solution to the following perturbed state equation on [0, T ]:dx
ε
j =
{
A˜xεj + B˜(vj + εvj) + F1mx
}
dt+
{
C˜xεj + D˜(vj + εvj) + F2mx
}
dW˜j(t)
xεj(0) = ζj .
Then denoting xj(·) the solution to the FSDE (19), we have xεj(·) = xj(·) + εxj(·) and
J
f
j (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·) + εvj(·)) − Jfj (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·))
=
ε
2
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q˜
(
2xj − 2
(
λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx
)
+ εxj
)
, xj
〉
+
〈
R˜(2vj + εvj), vj
〉)
dt+
〈
H˜(2xj(T ) + εxj(T )), xj(T )
〉}
=εE
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q˜
(
xj −
(
λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx
))
, xj
〉
+
〈
R˜vj , vj
〉)
dt
+
〈
H˜xj(T ), xj(T )
〉}
+
ε2
2
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q˜xj , xj
〉
+
〈
R˜vj , vj
〉)
dt+
〈
H˜xj(T ), xj(T )
〉}
.
On the other hand, applying Itoˆ’s formula to
〈
yj , xj
〉
, and taking expectation, we obtain
E
[〈
H˜xj(T ), xj(T )
〉]
=E
{∫ T
0
(〈
B˜⊤yj + D˜
⊤zj , vj
〉
−
〈
Q˜
(
xj −
(
λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx
))
, xj
〉)
dt
}
.
Hence,
J
f
j (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·) + εvj(·))− Jfj (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·))
=εE
{∫ T
0
〈
B˜⊤yj + R˜vj + D˜
⊤zj , vj
〉
dt
}
+
ε2
2
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q˜xj , xj
〉
+
〈
R˜vj , vj
〉)
dt+
〈
H˜xj(T ), xj(T )
〉}
.
It follows that
J
f
j (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·)) ≤ Jfj (ξ0, ζj ,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·), vj(·) + εvj(·)),
∀vj(·) ∈ Vdj [0, T ], ∀ε ∈ R,
if and only if (17) and (18) hold.
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Furthermore, if we assume that R˜ is invertible, then we have
vj = −R˜−1(B˜⊤yj + D˜⊤zj), (20)
so the related Hamiltonian system can be represented by
dxj = {A˜xj − B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤yj + D˜⊤zj) + F1mx}dt
+ {C˜xj − D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤yj + D˜⊤zj) + F2mx}dW˜j(t)
dyj = −
{
A˜⊤yj + C˜
⊤zj + Q˜
(
xj −
(
λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx
))}
dt+ zjdW˜j(t),
xj(0) = ζj , yj(T ) = H˜xj(T ), j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf ,
Based on above analysis, it follows that
mx(·) = lim
Nf→+∞
1
Nf
Nf∑
j=1
xj(·) = E[xj(·)]. (21)
Here, the first equality of (21) is due to the consistency condition: the frozen term mx(·) should equal
to the average limit of all realized states xj(·); the second equality is due to the law of large numbers.
Thus, by replacing mx by E[xj ], we get the following system
dxj = {A˜xj − B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤yj + D˜⊤zj) + F1E[xj ]}dt
+ {C˜xj − D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤yj + D˜⊤zj) + F2E[xj ]}dW˜j(t)
dyj = −
{
A˜⊤yj + C˜
⊤zj + Q˜
(
xj −
(
λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3E[xj ]
))}
dt+ zjdW˜j(t),
xj(0) = ζj , yj(T ) = H˜xj(T ), j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf ,
As all agents are statistically identical, thus we can suppress subscript “j” and the following consistency
condition system arises for generic agent:
dx = {A˜x− B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F1E[x]}dt
+ {C˜x− D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F2E[x]}dW˜ (t)
dy = −
{
A˜⊤y + C˜⊤z + Q˜
(
x− (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3E[x]))}dt+ zdW˜ (t),
x(0) = ζ, y(T ) = H˜x(T ),
(22)
where W˜ stands for a generic Brownian motion on (Ω,F ,P) and it is independent of W0. ζ is a repre-
sentative element of {ζj}1≤j≤Nf , and X0(·), mX(·) are to be determined.
3.2 Open-loop strategies for the major leader
Once Problem (OL1) is solved, we turn to solve Problem (OL2) about the major leader (agent
A0). Note that when the followers take their optimal respond vj(·) given by (20), the major leader ends
up with the following state equation system:
dX0 = {A0X0 +B0u0 + E10mX + F 10E[x]}dt+ {C0X0 +D0u0 + E20mX + F 20E[x]}dW0(t),
dx = {A˜x− B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F1E[x]}dt+ {C˜x− D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F2E[x]}dW˜ (t),
dy = −
{
A˜⊤y + C˜⊤z + Q˜
(
x− (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3E[x]))}dt+ zdW˜ (t),
X0(0) = ξ0, x(0) = ζ, y(T ) = H˜x(T ).
(23)
And its cost functional is given by (14). Note that equation (23) is a two-point boundary value problem for
SDEs, which is what we call a forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE; see [26,32–34])
and the cost functional is still linear quadratic form. Hence, we are going to solve the LQ problem for
a FBSDE. Noting that this FBSDE is coupled, therefore, it is not so easy to deal with it. Let us keep
in mind that the “state” for (23) is the triple (X0(·), x(·), y(·)). The main result of this section can be
stated as follows.
10
Theorem 3.2. Under assumptions (H1), (H2), and let ξ0, ζ ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn), mX(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn) be
given. Then u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ] is an open-loop decentralized optimal control of Problem (OL2) for initial
value ξ0 if and only if the following two conditions hold:
(i) The adapted solution (X0(·), x(·), (y(·), z(·)), (Y0(·), Z0(·)), (p(·), q(·)),K(·)) to the FBSDE on [0, T ]
dX0 = {A0X0 +B0u0 + E10mX + F 10E[x]}dt+ {C0X0 +D0u0 + E20mX + F 20E[x]}dW0(t),
dx = {A˜x− B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F1E[x]}dt+ {C˜x− D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F2E[x]}dW˜ (t),
dy = −
{
A˜⊤y + C˜⊤z + Q˜
(
x− (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3E[x]))}dt+ zdW˜ (t),
dY0 = −{A⊤0 Y0 + C⊤0 Z0 +Q0(X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)E[x])) + Q˜λ˜1K}dt+ Z0dW0(t),
dp = −{A˜⊤p+ C˜⊤q + F 10
⊤
E[Y0] + F
2
0
⊤
E[Z0] + F
⊤
1 E[p] + F
⊤
2 E[q] + Q˜λ˜3E[K]
− (1− λ0)Q0(X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)E[x]))− Q˜K}dt+ qdW˜ (t),
dK = {A˜K + B˜R˜−1B˜⊤p+ B˜R˜−1D˜⊤q}dt+ {C˜K + D˜R˜−1B˜⊤p+ D˜R˜−1D˜⊤q}dW˜ (t),
X0(0) = ξ0, x(0) = ζ, y(T ) = H˜x(T ), Y0(T ) = H0X0(T ), p(T ) = −H˜K(T ), K(0) = 0,
(24)
satisfies the following stationarity condition:
B⊤0 Y0 +D
⊤
0 Z0 +R0u0 = 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. (25)
(ii) The following convexity condition holds:
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q0
(
X0 − (1 − λ0)x
)
,
(
X0 − (1− λ0)x
)〉
+
〈
R0u0, u0
〉)
dt
+
〈
H0X0(T ), X0(T )
〉}
≥ 0, ∀u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ],
(26)
where (X0(·), x(·)) is the solution to the FBSDE
dX0 = {A0X0 +B0u0 + F 10E[x]}dt+ {C0X0 +D0u0 + F 20E[x]}dW0(t),
dx = {A˜x− B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F1E[x]}dt+ {C˜x− D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F2E[x]}dW˜ (t),
dy = −
{
A˜⊤y + C˜⊤z + Q˜
(
x− (λ˜1X0 + λ˜3E[x]))}dt+ zdW˜ (t),
X(0) = 0, x(0) = 0, y(T ) = H˜x(T ).
(27)
Or, equivalently, the map u0(·) 7→ J0(ξ0,mX(·),mx(·);u0(·)) is convex.
Proof. For given ξ0, ζ ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn), mX(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn), and u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ], let (X0(·), x(·),
(y(·), z(·)), (Y0(·), Z0(·)), (p(·), q(·)), K(·)) be adapted solution to FBSDE (24). For any u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ]
and ε ∈ R, let Xε0(·), xε(·), (yε(·), ze(·)) be the solution to the following perturbed state equation on
[0, T ]: 
dXε0 = {A0Xε0 +B0(u0 + εu0) + E10mX + F 10 E[xε]}dt
+ {C0Xε0 +D0(u0 + εu0) + E20mX + F 20E[xε]}dW0(t),
dxε = {A˜xε − B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤yε + D˜⊤zε) + F1E[xε]}dt
+ {C˜xε − D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤yε + D˜⊤zε) + F2E[xε]}dW˜ (t),
dyε = −
{
A˜⊤yε + C˜⊤zε + Q˜
(
xε − (λ˜1Xε0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3E[xε]))}dt+ zεdW˜ (t),
Xε0(0) = ξ0, x
ε(0) = ζ, yε(T ) = H˜xε(T ).
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Then denoting (X0(·), x(·), (y(·), z(·))) the solution to the FBSDE (27), we have Xε0(·) = X0(·) + εX0(·),
xε(·) = x(·) + εx(·), yε(·) = y(·) + εy(·), zε(·) = z(·) + εz(·) and
J0(ξ0,mX(·),E[x + εx];u0(·) + εu0(·))− J0(ξ0,mX(·),E[x];u0(·))
=
ε
2
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q0
(
2X0 − 2
(
λ0mX + (1 − λ0)E[x]
)
+ ε
(
X0 − (1− λ0)E[x]
))
,(
X0 − (1 − λ0)E[x]
)〉
+
〈
R0(2u0 + εu0), u0
〉)
dt+
〈
H0(2X0(T ) + εX0(T )), X0(T )
〉}
=εE
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q0
(
X0 −
(
λ0mX + (1− λ0)E[x]
))
,
(
X0 − (1 − λ0)E[x]
)〉
+
〈
R0u0, u0
〉)
dt
+
〈
H0X0(T ), X0(T )
〉}
+
ε2
2
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q0
(
X0 − (1− λ0)x
)
,
(
X0 − (1− λ0)x
)〉
+
〈
R0u0, u0
〉)
dt+
〈
H0X0(T ), X0(T )
〉}
.
On the other hand, applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈Y0, X0〉+ 〈p, x〉+ 〈K, y〉, and taking expectation, we obtain
E
[
H0X0(T )X0(T )
]
= E
{∫ T
0
(
−
〈
Q0
(
X0 −
(
λ0mX + (1− λ0)E[x]
))
,
(
X0 − (1 − λ0)E[x]
)〉
+
〈
B⊤0 Y0 +D
⊤
0 Z0, u0
〉)
dt.
Hence,
J0(ξ0,mX(·),E[x + εx];u0(·) + εu0(·)) − J0(ξ0,mX(·),E[x];u0(·))
=
ε2
2
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q0
(
X0 − (1− λ0)x
)
,
(
X0 − (1− λ0)x
)〉
+
〈
R0u0, u0
〉)
dt
+
〈
H0X0(T ), X0(T )
〉}
+ εE
{∫ T
0
〈
B⊤0 Y0 +D
⊤
0 Z0 +R0u0, u0
〉
dt
}
It follows that
J0(ξ0,mX(·),E[x];u0(·)) ≤ J0(ξ0,mX(·),E[x + εx];u0(·) + εu0(·)), ∀u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ], ∀ε ∈ R,
if and only if (25) and (26) hold.
Similarly, if we assume R0 is invertible, then we can represent the optimal control by
u0 = −R−10 (B⊤0 Y0 +D⊤0 Z0). (28)
Then the following coupled system follows
dX0 = {A0X0 −B0R−10 (B⊤0 Y0 +D⊤0 Z0) + E10mX + F 10E[x]}dt
+ {C0X0 −D0R−10 (B⊤0 Y0 +D⊤0 Z0) + E20mX + F 20E[x]}dW0(t),
dx = {A˜x− B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F1E[x]}dt+ {C˜x− D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F2E[x]}dW˜ (t)
dK = {A˜K + B˜R˜−1B˜⊤p+ B˜R˜−1D˜⊤q}dt+ {C˜K + D˜R˜−1B˜⊤p+ D˜R˜−1D˜⊤q}dW˜ (t)
dY0 = −{A⊤0 Y0 + C⊤0 Z0 +Q0(X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)E[x])) + Q˜λ˜1K}dt+ Z0dW0(t),
dy = −
{
A˜⊤y + C˜⊤z + Q˜
(
x− (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3E[x]))}dt+ zdW˜ (t),
dp = −{A˜⊤p+ C˜⊤q + F 10
⊤
E[Y0] + F
2
0
⊤
E[Z0] + F
⊤
1 E[p] + F
⊤
2 E[q] + Q˜λ˜3E[K]
− (1 − λ0)Q0(X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)E[x]))− Q˜K}dt+ qdW˜ (t),
X0(0) = ξ0, x(0) = ζ, K(0) = 0, Y0(T ) = H0X0(T ), y(T ) = H˜x(T ), p(T ) = −H˜K(T ),
(29)
where mX(·) is to be determined.
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3.3 Open-loop strategies for the minor leaders
Once Problem (OL2) is solved, we turn to solve Problem (OL3) about the minor leaders (agents
Ali, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nl). Note that when the followers takes their optimal responds vj(·) given by (20), and the
major leader takes his optimal control u0(·) given by (28), the minor leaders ends up with the following
state equation system:{
dXi = {AXi +Bui + E1mX}dt+ {CXi +Dui + E2mX}dWi(t)
Xi(0) = ξi, i = 1, 2, . . . , Nl.
And its cost functional is given by (15) with X0(·) being from (29). So it is similar to solve Problem
(OL1), and the main result in this section can be stated as follows.
Theorem 3.3. Under assumptions (H1), (H2), and let ξ0, ξi ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn), u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ], mX(·) ∈
L2(0, T ;Rn) be given. Then ui(·) ∈ Udi [0, T ] is a decentralized optimal control of Problem (OL3) for
initial value ξi if and only if the following two conditions hold:
(i) For i = 1, 2, . . . , Nl, the adapted solution (X i(·), Y i(·), Zi(·)) to the FBSDE on [0, T ]
dX i = {AXi +Bui + E1mX}dt+ {CX i +Dui + E2mX}dWi(t)
dY i = −
{
A⊤Y i + C⊤Zi +Q
(
X i −
(
λmX + (1− λ)X0
))}
dt+ ZidWi(t),
Xi(0) = ξi, Y i(T ) = HXi(T ),
(30)
satisfies the following stationarity condition:
B⊤Y i +Rui +D⊤Zi = 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. (31)
(ii) For i = 1, 2, . . . , Nl, the following convexity condition holds:
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
QXi, Xi
〉
+
〈
Rui, ui
〉)
dt+
〈
HXi(T ), Xi(T )
〉}
≥ 0, ∀ui(·) ∈ Udi [0, T ], (32)
where Xi(·) is the solution to the FSDEdXi =
{
AXi +Bui
}
dt+
{
CXi +Dui
}
dWi(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Xi(0) = 0.
(33)
Or, equivalently, the map ui(·) 7→ J li (ξ0, ξi,mX(·);u0(·), ui(·)) is convex (for i = 1, 2, . . . , Nl).
Proof. For given ξ0, ξi ∈ L2F0(Ω;Rn), u0(·) ∈ Ud0 [0, T ], mX(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn), and ui(·) ∈ Udi [0, T ], let
(X i(·), Y i(·), Zi(·)) be adapted solution to FBSDE (30). For any ui(·) ∈ Udi [0, T ] and ε ∈ R, let Xεi (·)
be the solution to the following perturbed state equation on [0, T ]:dX
ε
i =
{
AXεi +B(ui + εui) + E1mX
}
dt+
{
CXεi +D(ui + εui) + E2mX
}
dWi(t),
Xεi (0) = x.
Then denoting Xi(·) the solution to the FSDE (33), we have Xεi (·) = Xi(·) + εXi(·) and
J li (ξ0, ξi,mX(·);u0(·), ui(·) + εui(·))− J li(ξ0, ξi,mX(·);u0(·), ui(·))
=
ε
2
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q
(
2Xi − 2
(
λmX + (1 − λ)X0
)
+ εXi
)
, Xi
〉
+
〈
R(2ui + εui), ui
〉)
dt
+
〈
H(2Xi(T ) + εXi(T )), Xi(T )
〉}
=εE
{∫ T
0
(〈
Q
(
X i −
(
λmX + (1− λ)X0
))
, Xi
〉
+
〈
Rui, ui
〉)
dt+
〈
HXi(T ), Xi(T )
〉}
+
ε2
2
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
QXi, Xi
〉
+
〈
Rui, ui
〉)
dt+
〈
HXi(T ), Xi(T )
〉}
.
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On the other hand, applying Itoˆ’s formula to
〈
Y i, Xi
〉
, and taking expectation, we obtain
E
[〈
HXi(T ), Xi(T )
〉]
=E
{∫ T
0
(〈
B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi, ui
〉
−
〈
Q
(
Xi −
(
λmX + (1 − λ)X0
))
, Xi
〉)
dt
}
.
Hence,
J li(ξ0, ξi,mX(·);u0(·), ui(·) + εui(·))− J li (ξ0, ξi,mX(·);u0(·), ui(·))
=εE
{∫ T
0
〈
B⊤Y i +Rui +D⊤Zi, ui
〉
dt
}
+
ε2
2
E
{∫ T
0
(〈
QXi, Xi
〉
+
〈
Rui, ui
〉)
dt+
〈
HXi(T ), Xi(T )
〉}
.
It follows that
J li(ξ0, ξi,mX(·);u0(·), ui(·)) ≤ J li (ξ0, ξi,mX(·);u0(·), ui(·) + εui(·)), ∀ui(·) ∈ Udi [0, T ], ∀ε ∈ R,
if and only if (31) and (32) hold.
Furthermore, if we assume that R is invertible, then we have
ui = −R−1(B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi), (34)
so the related Hamiltonian system can be represented by
dX i = {AXi −BR−1(B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi) + E1mX}dt
+ {CXi −DR−1(B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi) + E2mX}dWi(t)
dY i = −
{
A⊤Y i + C⊤Zi +Q
(
Xi −
(
λmX + (1− λ)X0
))}
dt+ ZidWi(t),
X i(0) = ξi, Y i(T ) = HXi(T ),
Based on the above analysis, it follows that
mX(·) = lim
Nl→+∞
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
Xi(·) = E[X i(·)]. (35)
Here, the first equality of (35) is due to the consistency condition: the frozen term mX(·) should equal
to the average limit of all realized states Xi(·); the second equality is due to the law of large numbers.
Thus, by replacing mX by E[X i], we get the following system
dXi = {AXi −BR−1(B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi) + E1E[Xi]}dt+ {CXi −DR−1(B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi) + E2E[X i]}dWi(t)
dY i = −
{
A⊤Y i + C⊤Zi +Q
(
X i −
(
λE[X i] + (1− λ)X0
))}
dt+ ZidWi(t),
Xi(0) = ξi, Y i(T ) = HXi(T ),
As all agents are statistically identical, thus we can suppress subscript “i” and the following consistency
condition system arises for generic agent:
dX = {AX −BR−1(B⊤Y +D⊤Z) + E1E[X ]}dt+ {CX −DR−1(B⊤Y +D⊤Z) + E2E[X ]}dW (t)
dY = −
{
A⊤Y + C⊤Z +Q
(
X − (λE[X ] + (1− λ)X0))}dt+ ZdW (t),
X(0) = ξ, Y (T ) = HX(T ),
(36)
where W stands for a generic Brownian motion on (Ω,F ,P), and it is independent of W0, W˜ . ξ is a
representative element of {ξi}1≤i≤Nl .
To the end of the section, combined with (29) and (36), replacing mX by E[X], we can get the
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consistency condition system for open-loop strategy as follows.
dX0 = {A0X0 −B0R−10 (B⊤0 Y0 +D⊤0 Z0) + E10E[X] + F 10E[x]}dt
+ {C0X0 −D0R−10 (B⊤0 Y0 +D⊤0 Z0) + E20E[X] + F 20E[x]}dW0(t),
dX = {AX −BR−1(B⊤Y +D⊤Z) + E1E[X ]}dt+ {CX −DR−1(B⊤Y +D⊤Z) + E2E[X ]}dW (t)
dx = {A˜x− B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F1E[x]}dt+ {C˜x− D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F2E[x]}dW˜ (t)
dK = {A˜K + B˜R˜−1B˜⊤p+ B˜R˜−1D˜⊤q}dt+ {C˜K + D˜R˜−1B˜⊤p+ D˜R˜−1D˜⊤q}dW˜ (t)
dY0 = −{A⊤0 Y0 + C⊤0 Z0 +Q0(X0 − (λ0E[X ] + (1 − λ0)E[x])) + Q˜λ˜1K}dt+ Z0dW0(t),
dY = −
{
A⊤Y + C⊤Z +Q
(
X − (λE[X ] + (1− λ)X0))}dt+ ZdW (t),
dy = −
{
A˜⊤y + C˜⊤z + Q˜
(
x− (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2E[X ] + λ˜3E[x]))}dt+ zdW˜ (t),
dp = −{A˜⊤p+ C˜⊤q + F 10
⊤
E[Y0] + F
2
0
⊤
E[Z0] + F
⊤
1 E[p] + F
⊤
2 E[q] + Q˜λ˜3E[K]
− (1 − λ0)Q0(X0 − (λ0E[X] + (1− λ0)E[x]))− Q˜K}dt+ qdW˜ (t),
X0(0) = ξ0, X(0) = ξ, x(0) = ζ, K(0) = 0,
Y0(T ) = H0X0(T ), Y (T ) = HX(T ), y(T ) = H˜x(T ), p(T ) = −H˜K(T ),
(37)
4 The Consistency Condition System
Under assumptions (H1), (H2), when R˜(·), R0(·) and R(·) are always invertible, we get the consis-
tency condition (CC) for OL strategy in section 3. In this section, we turn to verify the well-posedness
of the CC equation.
For the simplicity of notation, denote X⊤ = (X0, X, x,K), Y⊤ = (Y0, Y , y, p), Z⊤ = (Z0, Z, z, q),
W⊤ = (W0,W, W˜ , W˜ ), and then the consistency condition system (37) can be rewritten as
dX ={AX+AE[X] +BY+EZ}dt+ {CX+CE[X] +DY+ FZ} ◦ dW(t)
dY =− {A⊤Y+A⊤0 E[Y] +C⊤Z+C⊤0 E[Z] +QX+QE[X]}dt+ Z ◦ dW(t),
X(0) =X0, Y(T ) = H0X(T ),
(38)
where
A =
(
A0 0 0 0
0 A 0 0
0 0 A˜ 0
0 0 0 A˜
)
, A =
(
0 E1
0
F 1
0
0
0 E1 0 0
0 0 F1 0
0 0 0 0
)
, C =
(
C0 0 0 0
0 C 0 0
0 0 C˜ 0
0 0 0 C˜
)
, C =
(
0 E2
0
F 2
0
0
0 E2 0 0
0 0 F2 0
0 0 0 0
)
,
B =
−B0R−10 B⊤0 0 0 00 −BR−1B⊤ 0 0
0 0 −B˜R˜−1B˜⊤ 0
0 0 0 B˜R˜−1B˜⊤
 , D =
−D0R−10 B⊤0 0 0 00 −DR−1B⊤ 0 0
0 0 −D˜R˜−1B˜⊤ 0
0 0 0 D˜R˜−1B˜⊤
 ,
E =
−B0R−10 D⊤0 0 0 00 −BR−1D⊤ 0 0
0 0 −B˜R˜−1D˜⊤ 0
0 0 0 B˜R˜−1D˜⊤
 , F =
−D0R−10 D⊤0 0 0 00 −DR−1D⊤ 0 0
0 0 −D˜R˜−1D˜⊤ 0
0 0 0 D˜R˜−1D˜⊤
 ,
A0 =
(
0 0 0 F 1
0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 F1
)
, C0 =
(
0 0 0 F 2
0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 F2
)
, H0 =
(
H0 0 0 0
0 H 0 0
0 0 H˜ 0
0 0 0 −H˜
)
, X0 =
(
ξ0
ξ
ζ
0
)
,
Q =
 −Q0 0 0 −Q˜λ˜1Q(1−λ) −Q 0 0
Q˜λ˜1 0 −Q˜ 0
Q0(1−λ0) 0 0 Q˜
 , Q =
 0 Q0λ0 Q0(1−λ0) 00 Qλ 0 0
0 Q˜λ˜2 Q˜λ˜3 0
0 −Q0λ0(1−λ0) −Q0(1−λ0)2 −Q˜λ˜3
 ,
4.1 Decoupling for open-loop strategy
Then, we turn to decouple the FBSDE (38) by Riccati equation. Note that
dE[X] =
[
(A+A)E[X] +BE[Y] +EE[Z]
]
dt.
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Hence,
d
(
X− E[X]
)
=
[
A(X− E[X]) +B(Y− E[Y]) +E(Z− E[Z])
]
dt
+ [C(X− E[X]) + (C+C)E[X] +DY+ FZ] ◦ dW(t).
Now, we assume that
Y(t) = P (t)
(
X(t)− E[X(t)]
)
+Π(t)E[X(t)], t ∈ [0, T ], (39)
for some deterministic and differentiable functions P (·) and Π(·), taking values in S4n, such that
P (T ) = H0, Π(T ) = H0.
Then
E[Y(t)] = Π(t)E[X(t)]
and
Y(t)− E[Y(t)] = P (t)
(
X(t)− E[X(t)]
)
.
Therefore,
dY =
[
P˙ (X− E[X]) + Π˙E[X]
]
dt+ P · d
(
X− E[X]
)
+ Π · dE[X]
=
{
P˙ (X− E[X]) + Π˙E[X] + P
[
A(X− E[X]) +B(Y− E[Y]) +E(Z− E[Z])
]
+Π
[
(A+A)E[X] +BE[Y] +EE[Z]
]}
dt
+ P
[
C(X− E[X]) + (C+C)E[X] +DY+ FZ
]
◦ dW(t).
(40)
Comparing the diffusion terms, we should have
Z = (I − PF)−1P
[
C(X− E[X]) + (C+C)E[X] +DY
]
. (41)
Then
E[Z] = (I − PF)−1P
[
(C+C)E[X] +DE[Y]
]
,
and
Z− E[Z] = (I − PF)−1P
[
C(X− E[X]) +D(Y− E[Y])
]
.
Comparing the drift terms, we should have
0 =P˙ (X− E[X]) + Π˙E[X] + P
[
A(X− E[X]) +B(Y− E[Y]) +E(Z− E[Z])
]
+Π
[
(A+A)E[X] +BE[Y] +EE[Z]
]
+ [A⊤Y+A⊤0 E[Y] +C
⊤
Z+C⊤0 E[Z] +QX+QE[X]]
=
{
P˙ + PA+A⊤P +C⊤(I − PF)−1PC+Q+ PBP
+ PE(I − PF)−1P (C+DP )
}(
X− E[X]
)
+
{
Π˙ + Π(A +A) + (A⊤ +A⊤0 )Π + ΠBΠ+Q+Q
+ (ΠE+C⊤ +C⊤0 )(I − PF)−1P (C+C+DΠ)
}
E[X].
(42)
Therefore, we should let P (·) and Π(·) be the solutions to the following Riccati equations, respectively:
P˙ + PA+A⊤P +C⊤(I − PF)−1PC+Q+ PBP
+ PE(I − PF)−1P (C+DP ) = 0,
P (T ) = H0,
(43)
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and 
Π˙ + Π(A +A) + (A⊤ +A⊤0 )Π + ΠBΠ+Q+Q
+ (ΠE+C⊤ +C⊤0 )(I − PF)−1P (C+C+DΠ) = 0,
Π(T ) = H0,
(44)
4.2 Decoupling for the feedback strategy
Except the pure open-loop method, we can also introducing the following Riccati equations to decouple
the Hamiltonian systems first.
The Hamiltonian system of minor follower is
dxj = [A˜xj + B˜vj + F1mx]dt+ [C˜xj + D˜vj + F2mx]dW˜j
dyj = −[A˜⊤yj + C˜⊤zj + Q˜(xj − (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx))]dt+ zjdW˜j
xj(0) = ζj , yj(T ) = H˜xj ,
with the stationary condition
vj = −R˜−1(B˜⊤yj + D˜⊤zj).
Assume that yj = P1xj +Φ1, and we can get the Riccati equations{
P˙1 + A˜
⊤P1 + P1A˜+ Q˜− P1B˜R˜−1B˜⊤P1 + S˜⊤R˜−1P1S˜ = 0
P1(T ) = H˜,
and  dΦ1 =
(
− A˜⊤Φ1 + P1B˜R˜−1B˜⊤Φ1 + Q˜(λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx)− P1F1mx − S˜⊤R˜−1f˜
)
dt
Φ1(T ) = 0,
where {
R˜ := I + P1D˜R˜−1D˜⊤, S˜ := C˜ − D˜R˜−1B˜⊤P1,
f˜ := P1F2mx − P1D˜R˜−1B˜⊤Φ1.
Note that
minor follower:
{
yj = P1xj +Φ1
zj = R˜−1P1S˜xj + R˜−1f˜ ,
so the feedback is
vj = −R˜−1
(
B˜⊤P1 + D˜⊤R˜−1P1S˜
)
xj − R˜−1B˜⊤Φ1 − R˜−1D˜⊤R˜−1f˜ .
The major leader ends up with the following Hamiltonian system
dX0 = (A0X0 +B0u0 + E
1
0mX + F
1
0mx)dt+ (C0X0 +D0u0 + E
2
0mX + F
2
0mx)dW0,
dmx = (A˜mx + B˜Φ1)dt+ (C˜mx + D˜Φ1)dW0,
dΦ1 = (Q˜λ˜1X0 + Q̂mx + ÂΦ1 + Q˜λ˜2mX)dt,
dY0 = −
{
A⊤0 Y0 + C
⊤
0 Z0 +Q0
(
X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)mx)
)
+ Q˜λ˜1y2
}
dt+ Z0dW0,
dy1 = −
{
A˜⊤y1 + C˜⊤z1 + Q̂⊤y2 + F 10
⊤
Y0 + F
2
0
⊤
Z0 − (1− λ0)Q0
(
X0 − (λ0mX + (1 − λ0)mx)
)}
dt+ z1dW0,
dy2 = −(B˜⊤y1 + D˜⊤z1 + Â⊤y2)dt,
X0(0) = ξ0,mx(0) = 0,Φ1(T ) = 0, Y0(T ) = H0X0(T ), y1(T ) = 0, y2(0) = 0,
with the stationary condition
u0 = −R−10 (B⊤0 Y0 +D⊤0 Z0),
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where
A˜ := A˜+ F1 − B˜R˜−1
(
B˜⊤P1 + D˜⊤R˜−1(P1S˜ + P1F2)
)
, B˜ := (B˜R˜−1D˜⊤R˜−1P1D˜ − B˜)R˜−1B˜⊤,
C˜ := C˜ + F2 − D˜R˜−1
(
B˜⊤P1 + D˜⊤R˜−1(P1S˜ + P1F2)
)
, D˜ := (D˜R˜−1D˜⊤R˜−1P1D˜ − D˜)R˜−1B˜⊤,
Â := (S˜⊤R˜−1P1D˜ + P1B˜)R˜−1B˜⊤ − A˜⊤, Q̂ := Q˜λ˜3 − P1F1 − S˜⊤R˜−1P1F2.
Assume that
−⇀
Y = P2
−⇀
X +Φ2, where
−⇀
X =
(
X0
mx
Φ1
)
,
−⇀
Y =
(
Y0
y1
y2
)
,
−⇀
Z =
(
Z0
z1
0
)
,
−⇀
W 0 =
(
W0
W0
0
)
,
and for simplicity, we rewrite the Hamiltonian system by{
d
−⇀
X = (L11
−⇀
X + L12
−⇀
Y + L13
−⇀
Z + f1)dt+ (L21
−⇀
X + L22
−⇀
Y + L23
−⇀
Z + f2) ◦ d−⇀W 0,
d
−⇀
Y = (L31
−⇀
X + L32
−⇀
Y + L33
−⇀
Z + f3)dt+
−⇀
Z ◦ d−⇀W 0,
where
L11 =
(
A0 F
1
0
0
0 A˜ B˜
Q˜λ˜1 Q̂ Â
)
, L12 =
(
−B0R−10 B⊤0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
, L13 =
(
−B0R−10 D⊤0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
,
L21 =
(
C0 F
2
0
0
0 C˜ D˜
0 0 0
)
, L22 =
(
−D0R−10 B⊤0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
, L23 =
(
−D0R−10 D⊤0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
,
L31 =
( −Q0 Q0(1−λ0) 0
Q0(1−λ0) −Q0(1−λ0)2 0
0 0 0
)
, L32 =
(
−A⊤
0
0 −Q˜λ˜1
−F 1
0
⊤ −A˜⊤ −Q̂⊤
0 −B˜⊤ −Â⊤
)
, L33 =
(
−C⊤
0
0 0
−F 2
0
⊤ −C˜⊤ 0
0 −D˜⊤ 0
)
,
f1 =
(
E1
0
mX
0
Q˜λ˜2mX
)
, f2 =
(
E2
0
mX
0
0
)
, f3 =
(
Q0λ0mX
−Q0(1−λ0)2mX
0
)
,
then we can get the following Riccati equations
P˙2 + P2L11 − L32P2 − L31 + P2L12P2
+ (P2L13 − L33)(I − P2L23)−1P2(L21 + L22P2) = 0
P2(T ) = H0,
and 
Φ˙2 +
(
(P2L12 − L32) + (P2L13 − L33)(I − P2L23)−1P2L22
)
Φ2
+ P2f1 + (P2L13 − L33)(I − P2L23)−1f2 − f3 = 0
Φ2(T ) = 0.
So the feedback is
u0 =−
(
R
−1
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)[(
B⊤
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
(P2
−⇀
X +Φ2) +
(
D⊤
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
(I − P2L23)−1P2[(L21 + L22P2)−⇀X + L22Φ2]
]
=−
(
R
−1
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)[(
B⊤
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)(
P2 +
(
D⊤
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
(I − P2L23)−1P2(L21 + L22P2)
)−⇀
X
+
((
B⊤
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
+
(
D⊤
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
(I − P2L23)−1P2L22
)
Φ2
]
At last, the Hamiltonian system of minor leader is
dXi = [AXj +Bui + E1mX ]dt+ [CX i +Dui + E2mX ]dWi
dY i = −[A⊤Y i + C⊤Zi +Q(X i − (λmX + (1− λ)X0))]dt + ZidWi
Xi(0) = ξi, Y i(T ) = HXi,
with the stationary condition
ui = −R−1(B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi).
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Assume that Y i = P3X i +Φ3, and we can get the Riccati equations{
P˙3 +A
⊤P3 + P3A+Q− P3BR−1B⊤P3 + S⊤R−1P1S = 0
P3(T ) = H,
and  dΦ3 =
(
−A⊤Φ3 + P3BR−1B⊤Φ3 +Q(λmX + (1− λ)X0)− P3E1mX − S⊤R−1f
)
dt
Φ3(T ) = 0,
where {
R := I + P3DR−1D⊤, S := C −DR−1B⊤P3,
f := P3E2mX − P3DR−1B⊤Φ3.
Note that
minor leader:
{
Y i = P3Xi +Φ3
Zi = R−1P3SX i +R−1f,
so the feedback is
ui = −R−1
(
B⊤P3 +D⊤R−1P3S
)
Xi −R−1B⊤Φ3 −R−1D⊤R−1f.
5 ε-Nash Equilibrium Analysis
In above sections, we obtained the decentralized open-loop strategy of the mixed S-MM-MFG through
the consistency condition system. Now we turn to verify that it is the SNC approximate equilibrium (i.e.
ε-Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium). In order to ensure the solvability of the open-loop strategy, we
assume the Riccati equation (43) and (44) admits a unique solution. At the beginning, we first present
the definition of ε-SNC equilibrium.
Definition 5.1. A set of controls (u0, u1, . . . , uNl , v1, . . . , vNf ) ∈ Ud0 ×Ud ×Vd, for (1 +Nl+Nf ) agents
is called to satisfy an ε-SNC equilibrium with respect to the costs (J0,J l1 , . . . ,J lNl ,J
f
1 ,J fNf ), if there
exists ε = ε(N) ≥ 0 (N = min{Nl, Nf}), limN→∞ ε(N) = 0 such that for any fixed i = 1, 2, . . . , Nl,
j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf , we have 
J0(u0, u, v) ≤ J0(u0, u, v) + ε,
J li (u0, ui, u−i) ≤ J li (u0, ui, u−i) + ε,
J fj (u0, u, vj , v−j) ≤ J fj (u0, u, vj , v−j) + ε,
(45)
when any alternative control (u0, ui, vj) ∈ Ud0 × Udi × Vdj is applied by (A0,Ai,Bj).
At first, we present the main result in this section and its proof will be given later.
Theorem 5.1. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2), and if the conditions in the Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2,
Theorem 3.3 hold, then (u0, ui, vj) is an ε-Nash equilibrium of mixed S-MM-MFG for major leader agent
A0, each minor leader agent Ali, i = 1, 2, . . . , Nl, and each follower agent Afj , j = 1, 2, . . . , Nf . And
(u0, ui, vj) is given by 
u0(t) =−R−10 (t)(B0(t)⊤Y0(t) +D0(t)⊤Z0(t)),
ui(t) =−R−1(t)(B(t)⊤Y i(t) +D(t)⊤Zi(t)),
vj(t) =− R˜−1(t)(B˜(t)⊤yj(t) + D˜(t)⊤zj(t)),
(46)
for (Y0, Z0), (Y i, Zi), (yj , zj) solved by (37).
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For major leader A0, minor leaders Ali and followers Afj , the decentralized states X0, Xi and Y j are
given respectively by
dX0 =[A0X0 −B0R−10 (B⊤0 Y0 +D⊤0 Z0) + E10X
(Nl)
+ F 10 x
(Nf )]dt
+ [C0X0 −D0R−10 (B⊤0 Y0 +D⊤0 Z0) + E20X
(Nl)
+ F 20 x
(Nf )]dW0,
dX i =[AX i −BR−1(B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi) + E1X(Nl)]dt+ [CX i −DR−1(B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi) + E2X(Nl)]dWi
dxj =[A˜xj − B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤yj + D˜⊤zj) + F1x(Nf )]dt+ [C˜xj − D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤yj + D˜⊤zj) + F2x(Nf )]dW˜j
X0(0) =ξ0, X i(0) = ξi, xj(0) = ζj ,
(47)
where the processes (Y0, Z0), (Y i, Zi), (yj , zj) solved by (37). Let us first present following several lemmas
and for the simplicity of notation, we denote the inner product 〈 · , · 〉 = | · |2.
Lemma 5.1. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2), and if the conditions in the Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2,
Theorem 3.3 hold, then there exists a constant M independent of Nl and Nf , such that
sup
0≤i≤Nl
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣X i(t)∣∣2] < M,
sup
1≤j≤Nf
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣xj(t)∣∣2] < M.
Proof. From Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.3, the FBSDEs (16), (24) and (30) have a unique
solution (X0, Y0, Z0) ∈ L2F0(0, T ;R3n), (X i, Y i, Zi) ∈ L2Fi(0, T ;R3n) and (xj , yj , zj) ∈ L2Gj (0, T ;R3n),
1 ≤ i ≤ Nl, 1 ≤ j ≤ Nf . Thus, SDEs system (47) has also a unique solution
(X0, X1, . . . , XNl , x1, . . . , xNf ) ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rn)× L2F(0, T ;Rn)× . . .× L2F(0, T ;Rn).
From (47), by using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy (BDG) inequality, there exists a constant M , independent
of Nl and Nf , such that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣X0(s)∣∣2] ≤M +ME[ ∫ t
0
∣∣X0(s)∣∣2 + ∣∣X(Nl)(s)∣∣2 + ∣∣x(Nf )(s)∣∣2ds]
≤M +ME
[ ∫ t
0
∣∣X0(s)∣∣2 + 1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
∣∣X i(s)∣∣2 + 1
Nf
Nf∑
j=1
∣∣xj(s)∣∣2ds]
and by Gronwall’s inequality, we obtain
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣X0(s)∣∣2] ≤M +ME[ ∫ t
0
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
∣∣X i(s)∣∣2 + 1
Nf
Nf∑
j=1
∣∣xj(s)∣∣2ds]. (48)
Similarly, we have
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣Xi(s)∣∣2] ≤M +ME[ ∫ t
0
∣∣Xi(s)∣∣2 + 1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
∣∣Xi(s)∣∣2ds], 1 ≤ i ≤ Nl, (49)
and
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣xj(s)∣∣2] ≤M +ME[ ∫ t
0
∣∣xj(s)∣∣2 + 1
Nf
Nf∑
j=1
∣∣xj(s)∣∣2ds], 1 ≤ j ≤ Nf . (50)
Thus
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
Nl∑
i=1
∣∣Xi(s)∣∣2] ≤ E[ Nl∑
i=1
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣Xi(s)∣∣2] ≤MNl + 2ME[ ∫ t
0
Nl∑
i=1
∣∣Xi(s)∣∣2],
and
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
Nf∑
j=1
∣∣xj(s)∣∣2] ≤ E[ Nf∑
j=1
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣xj(s)∣∣2] ≤MNf + 2ME[ ∫ t
0
Nf∑
j=1
∣∣xj(s)∣∣2].
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By Gronwall’s inequality, it follows that E
[
sup0≤s≤t
∑Nl
i=1
∣∣Xi(s)∣∣2] = O(Nl), and E[ sup0≤s≤t∑Nfj=1 ∣∣xj(s)∣∣2] =
O(Nf ). Then, substituting this estimate to (49) and (50) and Gronwall’s inequality yields E
[
sup0≤s≤t
∣∣Xi(s)∣∣2] ≤
M , and E
[
sup0≤s≤t
∣∣xj(s)∣∣2] ≤M . By applying this estimate to (48), we get E[ sup0≤s≤t ∣∣X0(s)∣∣2] ≤M .
Now, we recall that
X
(Nl)
(t) =
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
X i(t), and x
(Nf )(t) =
1
Nf
Nf∑
j=1
xj(t),
then we have
Lemma 5.2. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2), and if the conditions in the Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2,
Theorem 3.3 hold, then there exists a constant M independent of Nl and Nf , such that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣X(Nl)(t)−mX(t)∣∣2] ≤ M
Nl
,
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣x(Nf )(t)−mx(t)∣∣2] ≤ M
Nf
.
Proof. For the first one, we have
d
(
X
(Nl) −mX
)
= (A+ E1)
(
X
(Nl) −mX
)
dt+
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
[CX i −DR−1(B⊤Y i +D⊤Zi) + E2X(Nl)]dWi(
X
(Nl) −mX
)
(0) = 0.
(51)
From (51), by using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy (BDG) inequality and Lemma 5.1, there exists a constant
M , independent of Nl and Nf , such that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣X(Nl) −mX ∣∣2(s)] ≤ M
Nl
+ME
[ ∫ t
0
∣∣X(Nl) −mX ∣∣2(s)ds],
and by Gronwall’s inequality, we obtain
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣X(Nl) −mX ∣∣2(s)] ≤ M
Nl
.
By the same way, we can prove the second formula.
Lemma 5.3. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2), and if the conditions in the Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2,
Theorem 3.3 hold, then there exists a constant M independent of Nl and Nf , we have∣∣∣J0(u0, u, v)− J0(u0)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
,∣∣∣J li (u0, ui, u−i)− J li (u0, ui)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
,∣∣∣J fj (u0, u, vj , v−j)− Jfj (u0, vj)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
,
where N := min{Nl, Nf}.
Proof. Let us first consider the major leader agent. Recall (4) and (14), we have
J0(u0, u, v)− J0(u0)
=
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[∥∥∥X0 − (λ0X(Nl) + (1 − λ0)x(Nf ))∥∥∥2
Q0
−
∥∥∥X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)mx)∥∥∥2
Q0
]
dt
}
,
=E
{∫ T
0
〈
Q0
(
X0 −
(
λ0mX + (1− λ0)mx
))
, λ0(mX −X(Nl)) + (1 − λ0)(mx − x(Nf ))
〉
dt
}
+
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
∥∥∥λ0(X(Nl) −mX) + (1− λ0)(x(Nf ) −mx)∥∥∥2
Q0
dt
}
.
(52)
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By Ho¨lder inequality and Lemma 5.1, there exists a constant M independent of Nl and Nf such that
E
{∫ T
0
〈
Q0
∣∣∣X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)mx)∣∣∣, ∣∣∣λ0(mX −X(Nl)) + (1− λ0)(mx − x(Nf ))∣∣∣〉dt}
≤E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)mx)∣∣∣2dt} 12
E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q0(λ0(mX −X(Nl)) + (1− λ0)(mx − x(Nf )))∣∣∣2dt} 12
≤ME
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q0(λ0(mX −X(Nl)) + (1− λ0)(mx − x(Nf )))∣∣∣2dt} 12 .
(53)
Noting (52), (53) and Lemma 5.2, there exists a constant M independent of Nl and Nf such that
E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q0(λ0(mX −X(Nl)) + (1− λ0)(mx − x(Nf )))∣∣∣2dt} 12
≤
{
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣X(Nl) −mX ∣∣2(s)] ∫ T
0
|Q0λ0|2dt
} 1
2
{
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣x(Nf ) −mx∣∣2(s)] ∫ T
0
|1− λ0|2dt
} 1
2
≤M
( 1√
Nl
+
1√
Nf
)
= O
( 1√
N
)
.
(54)
The rest two claims can be proved in the same way.
Remark 5.1. We denote M the common constant of the different boundaries. In the above lemmas, the
constant M may vary each line by line but it is always independent of the number of minor-leader agents
Nl and the number of follower agents Nf .
5.1 Major leader agent’s perturbation
In this subsection, we will prove that the control strategies set (u0, u1, . . . , uNl , v1, . . . , vNf ) given by
Theorem 5.1 is an ε-Nash equilibrium of mixed S-MM-MFG for major leader agent, i.e. there exists an
ε = ε(N) ≥ 0, limN→∞ ε(N) = 0 such that
J0(u0, u, v) ≤ J0(u0, u, v) + ε, ∀u0 ∈ Uc0 [0, T ].
Let us consider that the major leader agent A0 uses an alternative strategy u0, each minor leader
agent Ali uses the control ui = −R−1(t)(B(t)⊤Y i(t) + D(t)⊤Zi(t)) and each follower agent Afj uses
the control vj = −R˜−1(t)(B˜(t)⊤yj(t) + D˜(t)⊤zj(t)). To prove (u0, u1, . . . , uNl , v1, . . . , vNf ) is an ε-
Nash equilibrium for the major leader agent, we need to show that for possible alternative control u0,
infu0∈Uc0 [0,T ] J0(u0, u, v[u0]) ≥ J0(u0, u, v) − ε. Then we only need to consider the perturbation u0 ∈Uc0 [0, T ] such that J0(u0, u, v[u0]) ≤ J0(u0, u, v). By the representation of the cost functional in [31, 35],
we can give the representation of the cost functional as follows.
Proposition 5.1. Let (H1)-(H2) hold. There exists a bounded self-adjoint linear operator N0 : Uc0 [0, T ]→
Uc0 [0, T ], a bounded linear operator H0 : Rn → Uc0 [0, T ], a bounded real-valued function M0 : Rn → R
such that
J0(x0, x, y;u0, u[u0], v[u0]) = 1
2
{〈
N0u0(·), u0(·)
〉
+2
〈
H0(x0), u0(·)
〉
+M0(x0)
}
, ∀(x0, u0) ∈ Rn×Uc0 [0, T ].
Proof. Refer to Proposition 3.1 in [31].
So if we assume that N0 ≫ 0, from Lemma 5.3, then there exists a bounded constant c, such that
E
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣∣N 120 u0(t) +N− 120 H0(x0)∣∣∣2dt] ≤ J0(u0, u, v) + c ≤ J0(u0, u, v) + c ≤ J0(u0) + c+O( 1√
N
)
,
which implies that E
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣u0(t)∣∣2dt] ≤M , whereM is a constant independent of N . In fact, by bounded
inverse theorem, N−10 is bounded, so there exists a constant 0 < γ ≤ ‖N
1
2
0 ‖, such that
γE
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣u0(t)∣∣2dt] ≤ ‖N 120 ‖E[ ∫ T
0
∣∣∣u0(t) +N−10 H0(x0)∣∣∣2dt] ≤ J0(u0) + c+O( 1√
N
)
.
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Then we have E
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣u0(t)∣∣2dt] ≤M . Similar to Lemma 5.1, we can show that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣X0(t)∣∣2] ≤M. (55)
Lemma 5.4. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2), and if the conditions in the Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2,
Theorem 3.3 hold, for the major leader agent’s perturbation control u0, we have∣∣∣J0(u0, u, v)− J0(u0)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
Proof. Recall (4) and (14), we have
J0(u0, u, v)− J0(u0)
=
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[∥∥∥X0 − (λ0X(Nl) + (1− λ0)x(Nf ))∥∥∥2
Q0
−
∥∥∥X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)mx)∥∥∥2
Q0
]
dt
}
,
=E
{∫ T
0
〈
Q0
(
X0 −
(
λ0mX + (1− λ0)mx
))
, λ0(mX −X(Nl)) + (1− λ0)(mx − x(Nf ))
〉
dt
}
+
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
∥∥∥λ0(X(Nl) −mX) + (1− λ0)(x(Nf ) −mx)∥∥∥2
Q0
dt
}
.
(56)
By Ho¨lder inequality and (55), there exists a constant M independent of Nl and Nf such that
E
{∫ T
0
〈∣∣∣Q0
(
X0 −
(
λ0mX + (1− λ0)mx
))∣∣∣,
∣∣∣λ0(mX −X(Nl)) + (1− λ0)(mx − x(Nf ))
∣∣∣
〉
dt
}
≤E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣X0 − (λ0mX + (1− λ0)mx)
∣∣∣2dt
} 1
2
E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q0
(
λ0(mX −X
(Nl)) + (1− λ0)(mx − x
(Nf ))
)∣∣∣2dt
} 1
2
≤ME
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q0
(
λ0(mX −X
(Nl)) + (1− λ0)(mx − x
(Nf ))
)∣∣∣2dt
} 1
2
.
(57)
At last, same as the Lemma 5.3, noting (56), (57), and Lemma 5.2, there exists a constantM independent
of Nl and Nf such that
E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q0(λ0(mX −X(Nl)) + (1− λ0)(mx − x(Nf )))∣∣∣2dt} 12
≤
{
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣X(Nl) −mX ∣∣2(s)] ∫ T
0
|Q0λ0|2dt
} 1
2
{
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣x(Nf ) −mx∣∣2(s)] ∫ T
0
|1− λ0|2dt
} 1
2
≤M
( 1√
Nl
+
1√
Nf
)
= O
( 1√
N
)
.
(58)
Taking the advantage of Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.4, we can give the first part of the proof to the
Theorem 5.1, i.e. the control strategies set (u0, u1, . . . , uNl , v1, . . . , vNf ) given by Theorem 5.1 is an
ε-Nash equilibrium of the mixed S-MM-MFG for major leader agent.
Part A of the proof to Theorem 5.1
Combining Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.4, we have
J0(u0, u, v) ≤ J0(u0) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ J0(u0) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ J0(u0, u, v) +O
( 1√
N
)
,
where the second inequality comes from the fact that J0(u0) = infu0∈Uc0 [0,T ] J0(u0). Consequently, the
Theorem 5.1 holds for the major leader agent with ε = O
(
1√
N
)
.
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5.2 Minor leader agent’s perturbation
Now, let us consider the following case: a given minor leader agent Ali uses an alternative strategy
ui ∈ Uci [0, T ], the major leader agent uses u0, each follower agent Afj uses vj while other minor leader
agents use the control u−i. In fact, by the representation of the cost functional (which is similar to the
argument of major leader agent), to prove (u0, u1, . . . , uNl , v1, . . . , vNf ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the
minor leader agent, we only need to consider the perturbation ui ∈ Uci [0, T ] satisfying
E
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣ui(t)∣∣2dt] ≤M,
where M is a constant independent of Nl. Then similar to Lemma 5.1, we can show that
sup
1≤i≤Nl
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣Xi(t)∣∣2] ≤M. (59)
Lemma 5.5. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2), and if the conditions in the Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2,
Theorem 3.3 hold, then there exists a constant M independent of Nl and Nf , such that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣X(i,Nl)(t)−mX(t)∣∣2] ≤ M
Nl
,
where X(i,Nl)(t) = 1
Nl
(
Xi(t) +
∑
k 6=iXk(t)
)
.
Proof. In fact, we have
X(i,Nl)(t)−X(Nl)(t) = 1
Nl
Xi(t),
by (59) , it yields
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣X(i,Nl)(t)−X(Nl)(t)∣∣2] ≤ M
Nl
.
Combined with Lemma 5.2, we can directly get
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣X(i,Nl)(t)−mX(t)∣∣2] ≤ M
Nl
.
Lemma 5.6. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2), and if the conditions in the Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2,
Theorem 3.3 hold, for the minor leader agent’s perturbation control ui, we have∣∣∣J li (u0, ui, u−i)− J li(u0, ui)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
Proof. Recall (5) and (15), we have
J li (u0, ui, u−i)− J li (u0, ui)
=
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[∥∥∥Xi − (λX(i,Nl) + (1− λ)X0)∥∥∥2
Q
−
∥∥∥Xi − (λmX + (1− λ)X0)∥∥∥2
Q
]
dt
}
,
=E
{∫ T
0
〈
Q
(
Xi −
(
λmX + (1− λ)X0
))
, λ(mX −X(i,Nl))
〉
dt
}
+
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
∥∥∥λ(X(i,Nl) −mX)∥∥∥2
Q
dt
}
.
(60)
By same technique, applying Ho¨lder inequality, Lemma 5.5, and (59), there exists a constant M inde-
pendent of Nl and Nf such that
E
{∫ T
0
〈∣∣∣Q(Xi − (λmX + (1 − λ)X0))∣∣∣, ∣∣∣λ(mX −X(i,Nl))∣∣∣〉dt}
≤E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Xi − (λmX + (1 − λ)X0)∣∣∣2dt} 12E{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Qλ(mX −X(i,Nl))∣∣∣2dt} 12
≤ME
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Qλ(mX −X(i,Nl))∣∣∣2dt} 12 ≤M{E[ sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣X(i,Nl) −mX ∣∣2(s)] ∫ T
0
|Qλ|2dt
} 1
2
≤ M√
Nl
= O
( 1√
N
)
.
(61)
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Taking the advantage of Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.6, we can give the second part of the proof to
the Theorem 5.1, i.e. the control strategies set (u0, u1, . . . , uNl , v1, . . . , vNf ) given by Theorem 5.1 is an
ε-Nash equilibrium of the mixed S-MM-MFG for minor leader agent.
Part B of the proof to Theorem 5.1
Combining Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.6, we have
J li (u0, ui, u−i) ≤ J li(u0, ui) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ J li (u0, ui) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ J li (u0, ui, u−i) +O
( 1√
N
)
,
where the second inequality comes from the fact that J li (u0, ui) = infui∈Uci [0,T ] J
l
i (u0, ui). Consequently,
the Theorem 5.1 holds for the minor leader agent with ε = O
(
1√
N
)
.
5.3 Follower agent’s perturbation
At last, we consider the following case: a given follower agent Afj uses an alternative strategy vj ∈
Vcj [0, T ], the major leader agent uses u0, each minor leader agent Ali uses ui while other follower agents
use the control v−j . In fact, by the representation of the cost functional (which is similar to the argument
of major leader agent), to prove (u0, u1, . . . , uNl , v1, . . . , vNf ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the follower
agent, we only need to consider the perturbation vj ∈ Vcj [0, T ] satisfying
E
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣vj(t)∣∣2dt] ≤M,
where M is a constant independent of N . Then similar to Lemma 5.1, we can show that
sup
1≤j≤Nf
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣xj(t)∣∣2] ≤M. (62)
Lemma 5.7. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2), and if the conditions in the Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2,
Theorem 3.3 hold, then there exists a constant M independent of Nl and Nf , such that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣x(j,Nf )(t)−mx(t)∣∣2] ≤ M
Nf
,
where x(j,Nf )(t) = 1
Nf
(
xj(t) +
∑
k 6=j xk(t)
)
.
Proof. In fact, we have
x(j,Nf )(t)− x(Nf )(t) = 1
Nf
xj(t),
by (62) , it yields
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣x(j,Nf )(t)− x(Nf )(t)∣∣2] ≤ M
Nf
.
Combined with Lemma 5.2, we can directly get
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣x(j,Nf )(t)−mx(t)∣∣2] ≤ M
Nf
.
Lemma 5.8. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2), and if the conditions in the Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2,
Theorem 3.3 hold, for the follower agent’s perturbation control vj, we have∣∣∣J fj (u0, u, vj , v−j)− Jfj (u0, vj)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
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Proof. Recall (6) and (11), we have
J fj (u0, u, vj , v−j)− Jfj (u0, vj)
=
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[∥∥∥xj − (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2X(Nl) + λ˜3x(j,Nf ))∥∥∥2
Q˜
−
∥∥∥xj − (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx)∥∥∥2
Q˜
]
dt
}
,
=E
{∫ T
0
〈
Q˜
(
xj −
(
λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx
))
, λ˜2(mX −X(Nl)) + λ˜3(mx − x(j,Nf ))
〉
dt
}
+
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
∥∥∥λ˜2(mX −X(Nl)) + λ˜3(mx − x(j,Nf ))∥∥∥2
Q˜
dt
}
.
(63)
By Ho¨lder inequality and (62) there exists a constant M independent of Nl and Nf such that
E
{∫ T
0
〈∣∣∣Q˜(xj − (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx))∣∣∣, ∣∣∣λ˜2(mX −X(Nl)) + λ˜3(mx − x(j,Nf ))∣∣∣〉dt}
≤E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣xj − (λ˜1X0 + λ˜2mX + λ˜3mx)∣∣∣2dt} 12
E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q˜(λ˜2(mX −X(Nl)) + λ˜3(mx − x(j,Nf )))∣∣∣2dt} 12
≤ME
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q˜(λ˜2(mX −X(Nl)) + λ˜3(mx − x(j,Nf )))∣∣∣2dt} 12
(64)
At last, same as the Lemma 5.3, noting (63), (64), and Lemma 5.7, there exists a constantM independent
of Nl and Nf such that
E
{∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q˜(λ˜2(mX −X(Nl)) + λ˜3(mx − x(j,Nf )))∣∣∣2dt} 12
≤
{
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣X(Nl) −mX ∣∣2(s)] ∫ T
0
|Q˜λ˜2|2dt
} 1
2
{
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣x(j,Nf ) −mx∣∣2(s)] ∫ T
0
|λ˜3|2dt
} 1
2
≤M
( 1√
Nl
+
1√
Nf
)
= O
( 1√
N
)
.
(65)
Taking the advantage of Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.8, we can give the last part of the proof to the
Theorem 5.1, i.e. the control strategies set (u0, u1, . . . , uNl , v1, . . . , vNf ) given by Theorem 5.1 is an
ε-Nash equilibrium of the mixed S-MM-MFG for follower agent.
Part C of the proof to Theorem 5.1
Combining Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.8, we have
J fj (u0, u, vj , v−j) ≤ Jfj (u0, vj) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ Jfj (u0, vj) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ J fj (u0, u, vj , v−j) +O
( 1√
N
)
,
where the second inequality comes from the fact that Jfj (u0, vj) = infvj∈Vcj [0,T ] J
f
j (u0, vj). Consequently,
the Theorem 5.1 holds for the follower agent with ε = O
(
1√
N
)
. Finally, combined with the Part A, Part
B, we complete the proof to Theorem 5.1.
6 Special Case
In this section, we will give an example to show how the major leader influences the whole system.
We now look at a special case in which the major leader does not appear. In this case the problem is
reduced to a leader-follower mean-field LQG game problem. Let us still regard it as if the major leader
does appear but does not affect the game at all, i.e., we assume that
A0 = B0 = C0 = D0 = E
1
0 = F
1
0 = E
2
0 = F
2
0 = 0, Q0 = 0, H0 = 0, R0 = I. (66)
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Moreover, let λ = 1, λ˜1 = 0, λ˜2 = λ˜, and λ˜3 = 1 − λ˜. By observation, we can find that the coupled
mean-field term between the leaders and the followers appear on the cost functional of the followers.
Thus, it is truly a leader-follower mean-field LQG game problem. By the analysis above, we can get the
CC equation of the special case as follows.
dX = {AX −BR−1(B⊤Y +D⊤Z) + E1E[X ]}dt+ {CX −DR−1(B⊤Y +D⊤Z) + E2E[X ]}dW (t)
dx = {A˜x− B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F1E[x]}dt+ {C˜x− D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F2E[x]}dW˜ (t)
dK = {A˜K + B˜R˜−1B˜⊤p+ B˜R˜−1D˜⊤q}dt+ {C˜K + D˜R˜−1B˜⊤p+ D˜R˜−1D˜⊤q}dW˜ (t)
dY = −
{
A⊤Y + C⊤Z +Q
(
X − E[X ])}dt+ ZdW (t),
dy = −
{
A˜⊤y + C˜⊤z + Q˜
(
x− (λ˜E[X ] + (1− λ˜)E[x]))}dt+ zdW˜ (t),
dp = −{A˜⊤p+ C˜⊤q + F⊤1 E[p] + F⊤2 E[q] + Q˜(1− λ˜)E[K]− Q˜K}dt+ qdW˜ (t),
X(0) = ξ, x(0) = ζ, K(0) = 0,
Y (T ) = HX(T ), y(T ) = H˜x(T ), p(T ) = −H˜K(T ).
(67)
Furthermore, we find that the equation of K(·) and (p(·), q(·)) is coupled together but decoupled with
other equations and if the consistency condition equation admits a unique adapted solution then K ≡ 0,
p ≡ 0 and q ≡ 0 is the trivial solution to the equation. Then the CC equation of the special case is
simplified as
dX = {AX −BR−1(B⊤Y +D⊤Z) + E1E[X ]}dt+ {CX −DR−1(B⊤Y +D⊤Z) + E2E[X ]}dW (t)
dx = {A˜x− B˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F1E[x]}dt+ {C˜x− D˜R˜−1(B˜⊤y + D˜⊤z) + F2E[x]}dW˜ (t)
dY = −
{
A⊤Y + C⊤Z +Q
(
X − E[X ])}dt+ ZdW (t),
dy = −
{
A˜⊤y + C˜⊤z + Q˜
(
x− (λ˜E[X ] + (1− λ˜)E[x]))}dt+ zdW˜ (t),
X(0) = ξ, x(0) = ζ,
Y (T ) = HX(T ), y(T ) = H˜x(T ).
(68)
Next, by the decoupling for the open-loop strategy, we get the Riccati equations (43) and (44). However,
it is still hard to get the explicit solution to the Riccati equations. So we consider the 1-dimensional
example 5.1 as follows.
Example 5.1 Let n = m1 = m2 = m3 = 1, (66) holds, and let
A = A˜ = 0, B = B˜ = 0, E1 = F1 = 0,
C = C˜ = 0, D = D˜ = 1, E2 = F2 = 0,
Q = Q˜ = 1, R = R˜ = 1, H = H˜ = 0,
we have the state equation 
dXi(t) = ui(t)dWi(t),
dxj(t) = vj(t)dW˜j(t),
Xi(0) = ξi, xj(0) = ζj .
The cost functional reads
J li (ui(·),u−i(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(∣∣∣Xi(t)−X(Nl)(t)∣∣∣2 + |ui(t)|2)dt},
and
J fj (u(·), vj(·),v−j(·)) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
(∣∣∣xj(t)− (λ˜X(Nl)(t) + (1− λ˜)x(Nf )(t))∣∣∣2 + |vj(t)|2)dt},
and the Riccati equation{
P˙ +Q = 0,
P (T ) = 0,
and
{
Π˙ +Q+Q = 0,
Π(T ) = 0,
(69)
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where
Q =
(
0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0
0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 1
)
, Q =
(
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 λ˜ 1−λ˜ 0
0 0 0 λ˜−1
)
,
so it can be easily solved out that
P (t) =
( 0 0 0 0
0 t−T 0 0
0 0 t−T 0
0 0 0 T−t
)
, Π(t) =
(
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 T−λ˜t λ˜t−T 0
0 0 0 T−λ˜t
)
.
And the optimal control ui = −Z = 0, vj = −z = 0, subject to the optimal cost functional J li = 12ξ2i ,
and J fj = 12ζ2j .
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